Emotions in context: A sociodynamic model of emotions by Mesquita, Batja & Boiger, Michael
Running head: EMOTIONS IN CONTEXT   1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emotions in Context: A Socio-Dynamic Model of Emotions 
Batja Mesquita & Michael Boiger 
University of Leuven, Belgium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Address correspondence to: 
Batja Mesquita 
Center for Social and Cultural Psychology 
University of Leuven 
Tiensestraat 102, Box 3727 
3000 Leuven, Belgium 
Phone: ++32 16 325 868 
Fax: ++ 32 16 325 923 
E-mail: mesquita@psy.kuleuven.be 
  
Running head: EMOTIONS IN CONTEXT   2 
 
Abstract 
We propose a socio-dynamic model of emotions, in which emotions are seen as dynamic 
systems that emerge from the interactions and relationships in which they take place. Our  
model does not deny that emotions are biologically constrained, yet it takes seriously that 
emotions are situated in specific contexts. We conceive emotions as largely functional to the 
socio-cultural environment in which they occur; this is so because socio-cultural 
environments foster the emergence of emotions that positively contribute to social cohesion. 
The role of the social context includes actual, online shaping --affordances, constraints, and 
reward structures--, and thus goes beyond merely providing the content of cognitive 
representations (e.g., goals, concepts).  
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1. What are the essential elements of your theory of emotion? Which elements are 
shared by different theories? What element(s) distinguishes your theory from the 
others? 
There are two facts that most models of emotion fail to capture. First, the large 
majority of our emotions occur in the contexts of social interactions and relationships, and 
unfold in conjunction with these interactions and relationships (Boiger & Mesquita, 2012a; 
Butler, 2011; Parkinson, 2012). Second, emotional response selection tends to be functional 
(i.e. more often rewarding than not) within the specific socio-cultural contexts in which it 
occurs (e.g., Kitayama, Mesquita, & Karasawa, 2006; Mesquita, 2003). The socio-dynamic 
model we have developed tries to capture these two facts (Boiger & Mesquita, 2012a, 2012b, 
forthcoming; Mesquita, 2003, 2010; Mesquita, Deleersnyder, & Albert, forthcoming). 
First and foremost, the model proposes that emotions emerge from social interactions 
and relationships, which they in turn constitute, shape, and change. The point is not that 
emotions occur in response to social events; rather, it is that social interaction and emotions 
form one system of which the parts cannot be separated (Butler, 2011; Barrett, 2013). For 
example, think of how to properly describe a couple’s emotions in the course of a dispute, 
without also describing the unfolding interaction. The features of the system—recurrent 
states, and states to be avoided, as well as the (positive and negative) feedback loops between 
the partners—cannot be reduced to each individual’s emotions; nor can the emotions be fully 
disentangled from the interaction, in this case the dispute. Moreover, interactions at any point 
in time are afforded and constrained by the ongoing or developing relationships in which they 
take place. Again, the emotions of the couple at one point in time cannot properly be 
described without reference to the couple’s relationship history (Butner, Diamond, & Hicks, 
2007; Schoebi, 2008). Thus, emotional interactions are closely tied to the interpersonal 
contexts in which they take place. 
Running head: EMOTIONS IN CONTEXT   4 
 
A second aspect of our model is the assumption that emotions are functional to the 
specific social and cultural context in which they emerge. Thus, functionality according to our 
model is tied to the current social context, not necessarily to the evolutionary past of our 
ancestors (although this evolutionary past may have some characteristics in common with 
current social contexts). To the extent that emotions produce better outcomes within a certain 
context, they have been shown more frequent. This is true across different levels of “social 
context.” Child aggression is more likely to be observed when family members withdraw or 
lessen their demands (Patterson et al., 1998, quoted in Oatley et al., 2007); crying is more 
frequent when compatible with one’s gender role (Van Hemert, van de Vijver, & Vingerhoets, 
2011); and shame, which expresses a concern with others’ view of oneself, is more frequent in 
cultures that underline interdependence than in cultures of independence (Boiger, Mesquita, 
Uchida, & Barrett, 2013; Kitayama et al., 2006). We contend that functionality is no invariant 
property of the emotion or emotional response itself. Thus, shame is not generally 
dysfunctional, but only in cultures that highlight individual success and self-sufficiency 
(Mesquita & Karasawa, 2004). Similarly, emotional suppression as a strategy of regulation is 
not always dysfunctional, but only in cultural contexts that  value authenticity  (Butler, Lee, & 
Gross, 2007).   Functionality is contingent on the particular match with the social context in 
question.  
While a socio-dynamic view focuses attention on emotions as interpersonal systems 
(see also Butler, 2011), it does not preclude that emotions can be described at an intrapersonal 
level. However, our model is agnostic with respect to what exactly constitutes an emotion at 
the intrapersonal level. There is increasing evidence that emotions are psychological 
constructions (or emotional meta-experience) (e.g., Barrett, 2006, 2012; Russell, 2003). 
However, our model also allows for a representation of emotions in terms of patterns of 
emotion “components” such as appraisals, action tendencies, physiological responses, 
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behaviors, etc. The crucial point is that emotions, whether represented as psychological 
constructions or in terms of component patterns,  emerge in interplay with and derive their 
specific function from the social context. This means that emotional experience and behavior 
will be differently constructed across various contexts. Being angry with your boss may be a 
different emotion than being angry with your child; anger in a soured relationship may be 
different than anger in a flourishing one; and the modal construction of anger in Japan may be 
different than that in Belgium. Our model suggests a shift in research paradigm, but it does 
not have a full explanation for all phenomena ever counted to be emotional. 
 We see commonalities with all other approaches represented in this issue. Consistent 
with psychological constructionist theories and some appraisal theories, we submit that 
emotions are constructed in the moment, and that they emerge from lower-level systems 
(Barrett, 2006, 2009; Barrett & Russell, forthcoming; Gendron & Barrett, 2009; Russell, 
2003; Moors, this issue). However, our model places “construction” at the interface between 
individual and environment, and not primarily in the head of the individual.  The role of the 
social context includes the actual, online shaping of emotions by the social environment. 
Examples are the reinforcement structure of the social environment, including reinforcements 
within interactions or relationships; the socio-cultural opportunities and constraints for 
emotional interpretation and behavior; and the affordances offered by the unfolding 
interaction (see Parkinson, 2012 for a similar view). Importantly, social context goes beyond 
merely providing the content of the representations (i.e., the former experiences, concerns, 
values, and goals, or even (socially consensual) concepts) that serve as input for the emotion. 
 Our view is also consistent with evolutionary accounts (e.g., Tracy, this issue) at least 
to the extent that we equally emphasize the functionality of emotions (and emotional 
responses) for (social) life. We are less inclined to attribute specific functions to “distinct 
emotions” (Tracy, p. X), because we think of the functionality of an emotion as context-
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specific, rather than as an inherent quality of the emotion. While we agree, for instance, that 
anger is often associated with the overarching goal of dominance and self-assertion, this may 
be functional in some types of relationship contexts (a male boss to his employee), but not in 
others (a female boss to her employee).   
2. One way to clarify just what a claim includes is to ask what it excludes. That is, 
what would falsify a claim? Please elaborate on those distinguishing elements of your 
theory by stating how, at least in principle, they would be falsified.  
Our model specifies the following predictions: 
i. Emotions are situated: They are dynamically changing in conjunction with changes in the social 
context  
This prediction would be falsified by finding that the course of an individual’s emotions is 
not contingent on social context. This would be the case, for instance, when the type of 
emotion determines its temporal course, but not the type of situation (interaction, relationship, 
culture). Research charting temporal changes in emotions is scarce, and only a handful of 
studies have examined the course of emotions in conjunction with the development of social 
situations. However, so far these studies have found an association between the duration of 
the emotion and the course of the event (Verduyn, Delvaux et al., 2009) 
Our claims would be equally dismissed by the finding that having or expressing an 
emotion is in no ways dependent on the emotions of (close) others and, in turn has no 
influence on them. The growing evidence that emotions are co-regulated between partners 
(see Butler & Randall, 2012) and the finding that emotional co-dependencies within 
interacting dyads depend on the dyad’s relational history largely supports our claims so far. 
ii. The social functionality of emotions (or emotional components) predicts their occurrence. 
The prediction would be falsified if the social rewards for an emotion were not predictive 
of its frequency or intensity. Evidence so far is consistent with our theoretical perspective: 
Emotions and emotional responses that are valued in a particular socio-cultural context, tend 
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to be more prevalent and more intense (see the example at the beginning of this article). 
Moreover, at the level of social interactions and relationships, we would predict to see that 
socio-culturally valued emotions are afforded and promoted, while disvalued emotions are 
prevented and discouraged. The jury is still out on this prediction, but disconfirming it would 
challenge our model.  
iii. The patterns of components constituting an emotion will vary across contexts; i.e., 
across different interactions, relationships, and cultural contexts. 
This prediction would be falsified if research yielded invariant patterns of emotion 
components (i.e., appraisals, physiological changes, localized brain activation, expressions, 
behaviors) across different instances of a similar emotion. Evidence from emotion research is 
currently consistent with the prediction of variance within an emotion category. For instance, 
there are individual differences in the appraisals that people experience when angry, and no 
one appraisal appears to be sufficient or necessary for the experience of anger (Kuppens, Van 
Mechelen, Smits, & De Boeck, 2003; Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, De Boeck, & 
Ceulemans, 2007). Furthermore, there is some evidence of differences in the emotional 
components associated with amusement, according to relational context: Friends’ emotional 
expressions and appraisals of amusement were found to be more similar than those of 
strangers (Bruder, Dosmukhambetova, Nerb, & Manstead, 2012). Finally, there is cultural 
variation in the appraisals and action tendencies that people commonly associate with anger 
and shame. In our own research, we found that, the typical appraisals associated with shame 
and anger (and with shame and anger situations) differed appreciably between participants 
from the  U.S., Japan and Belgium (Boiger, De Leersnyder, et al., 2013).   Using a statistical 
classification model, it was possible to infer participants’ cultural origin, both based on the 
patterns of appraisal and action readiness that were associated with particular antecedent 
events, and based on the patterns of appraisal and action readiness predicting the intensity of 
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the emotion (either shame or anger). This means that the profiles of emotion appraisals and 
action readiness associated with antecedent situations on the one hand, and with the emotions 
of shame and anger on the other, were specific to particular contexts cultural contexts.  While 
the evidence for contextual variation in emotions is spotty, it has proved consistent with our 
predictions so far. 
We remark that falsification is only one criterion by which to evaluate a theory: The 
other would be whether it produces interesting questions, connects findings that were hitherto 
not connected, and provides insightful explanations for findings that were poorly understood 
before. By making the socio-cultural contexts in which emotions unfold a topic of 
investigation, our perspective has shed light on the situated nature of emotions. Rather than 
aggregating emotional experiences across instances,  our model suggests examining the 
situated responses. Rather than averaging responses across different situational contexts per 
emotional category, we suggest to differentiate between different types of situations. This will 
yield a more fine-grained understanding of person-related, relationship-related, and culture-
related differences, distinguishing contexts of difference and similarity. By specifying the 
multiple, nested contexts and the interdependencies between them, we provide a meta-theory 
that can explain and combine context-specificities at multiple levels of contextuality which 
were hitherto largely investigated in isolation – e.g., interactions, relationships and cultures 
(Boiger & Mesquita, 2012a). Finally, by highlighting the context-specific social functions of 
emotions, our perspective allows to analyze cultural variation in components that previous 
research frequently failed to sufficiently explain (e.g., Scherer & Wallbott, 1994). The 
importance of falsification notwithstanding, we think that our theory is especially valuable by 
these latter criteria.  
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3. How does your theory view the relation of emotional experience (the subjective 
conscious feeling in an emotion) to the perception of emotion in another? What is each 
process? Are they qualitatively different processes? The same process? Are they linked? 
Emotional experience can be seen as “the perception of emotions in oneself”. Both 
emotional experience and the perception of emotions in other people share with other 
perceptual processes that they combine top-down and bottom-up processes (Barrett, 2006). 
Top down processes for both emotional experience and emotional perception in others include 
conceptual and situational knowledge. We submit that these top down processes are in flux 
themselves, as ongoing interactions and relationships afford selection and update. Some of the 
bottom-up processes are shared in principle: Both emotional experience and emotion 
perception in others have access to contextual information. However, there will also be 
differences between the bottom-up processes constituting emotional experience and 
perception of emotion in others respectively: Emotional experience accesses interoceptive 
information, whereas emotion perception in others can draw on certain expressive information 
to which an individual him or herself has no access.  
4.  Emotions are now typically thought of as having components, such as changes in 
the peripheral nervous system, facial movements, and instrumental behavior. What 
precisely does your theory say about the relation of emotion to the components? 
We conceive of emotions as constructed from dynamic processes that unfold over time 
and are situated in interactions, relationships, and ultimately in cultures (Boiger & Mesquita, 
2012a; Mesquita, 2010). According to the view that emotions emerge rather than exist a 
priori, what we call “emotion” is really a collection of different constituents (e.g., cognitive, 
behavioral, physiological responses) that interact over time (e.g., Barrett, 2009; Lewis, 2005). 
Moreover, emotions emerge from the interplay between these individual processes and the 
social context in which they take place. As emotions are constructed “in the moment” during 
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ongoing interactions, they cannot be properly modeled without considering the interaction 
between individuals from which they emerge.  
5. Is there variability in emotional responding within a given category of emotion (such 
as fear, anger, etc.)? If so, how does your theory explain that variability? 
Variability is key to our emotion model. We conceive of emotions as momentary 
constructions afforded and constrained by social interactions in which they take place. The 
multitude of possible interactions ensures variability in emotions. This means, for example, 
that what people call anger may differ across different types of interactions and in different 
relationships. While finding variability within emotions has not been the focus of much 
research, there is some evidence in support of our proposal. This means that what we call 
anger varies across different instances. Even more supportive of the idea of situated emotions 
is the finding that  particular configurations of anger responses co-occurred with particular 
types of situations (e.g., lower-status versus-higher status target ) (Van Coillie, Van 
Mechelen, & Ceulemans, 2006).  
What people call anger or some translation of anger may also be different across 
cultures. This is the case in part because the conceptual domain is differently carved up, or 
even differently made. An example of this is the Turkish word for anger, kızgınlık, which 
refers to anger as it occurs in intimate relationships, and has a connotation of sadness or 
disappointment (Mesquita, 1993). English does not have a word that covers the same palette 
of feelings (See also Wierzbicka 1992, for other examples). A different concept may itself 
contribute to a different emergent emotion, creating more opportunity to apply the available 
concept (Barrett, 2006, 2012).  
Perhaps more importantly: The labeling of emotions does not seem to use the same 
criteria in all cultures. In some cultures, for instance, the equivalent of the word ‘shame’ is 
used when the situation is one of threatened honor, rather than for a particular mental state 
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(Abu-Lughod, 1986); the mental state of ‘shame’ may or may not be present when a person is 
ashamed. Variability in the emotional responding associated with a particular category of 
emotion may thus be due to different conceptions of emotion itself. 
Finally, what people call anger may also cross-culturally differ because the words map 
onto different cultural realities. It is important to be aware that the construction of emotion is 
an ongoing, dynamic process contingent on the interactions and relationships within the 
culture. Social constructions of emotion thus result in a mosaic of related, but different 
situated processes. Within each culture, particular emotion categories refer to this mosaic. The 
traditional model of emotions as entities has led to describing cultural differences in emotions 
based on cultural aggregates. Our model of emotions suggests that a cultural category of the 
emotion refers to a mosaic of situated instances of the emotion. Average cultural profiles of 
emotion hide a lot of individual variation at the level of emotional episodes, and should thus 
be unpacked in terms of their variation across meaningful types of situations. 
Granted, all these variations beg the question of comparability of concepts across 
cultures. This is an old question, and our answer would be that it is important to justify and 
articulate the reasons to compare particular concepts across different languages (Mesquita & 
Frijda, 1992). In other words, if we were to compare kızgınlık in Turkish with anger in 
English, we would have to articulate in which regards these words are known to be similar. 
The shared similarity between those words will make any difference between the associated 
emotions interpretable. 
Finally, emotions are not all variability. Most cultures have a word for anger (Russell, 
1991), and across languages, translations of anger refer to experiences that are at least 
comparable (or they would not have been translations of each other). Also, human beings all 
have brains and bodies, and share some potential for emotions. Emotions are thus biologically 
constrained. However, what exactly humans share may not be ready-made emotion packages, 
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but rather the systems constituting emotions. What human beings also share are social 
environments with logically limited possibilities for interaction. Think about it: What other 
possible relational engagements would there be except for being either submissive or 
dominant, either to approach (be close) or to avoid (be distant), either to oppose (be 
antagonistic) or to yield (be agreeable)? Thus, even cross-cultural similarity may emerge from 
similarity in the types of social interactions and relationships that occur across cultures.  
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